Abstract
We review exploration on profit models used by online enterprises who offer digital goods. similar goods arenon-rival, have near zero borderline cost of product and distribution, low borderline cost of consumer hunt, and low sale costs. also, enterprises can fluently observe and measure consumer geste . We start by asking what consumers can offer in exchange for digital goods. We suggest that consumers can offer their plutocrat, particular information, or time. enterprises, in turn, can induce profit by dealing digital content, brokering consumer information, or showing advertising. We bandy the establishment’s trade- off in choosing between the different profit aqueducts, similar as offering paid content or free content while counting on advertising earnings. We also turn to specific challenges enterprises face when choosing a profit model grounded on either content, information, or advertising. also, we bandy incipient profit models that combine different profit aqueducts similar as crowdfunding( content and information) or blogs( information and advertising). We conclude with a discussion of openings for unborn exploration including counteraccusations for enterprises ’ profit models from the adding significance of the mobile Internet.

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Notes
1: We concentrate on profit models for digital products, abstracting from settings where the internet is used simply to communicate or vend physical products. By “ online, ” we mean using digital communication channels. Because these are digital products, “ online enterprises ” refers to those enterprises that communicate with, and vend to, consumers using digital communication, generally through the internet.

2: Despite nonsupervisory sweats and technological advances, pirating of digital content remains an issue. There's presently no academic agreement on whether pirating hurts deals. Liebowitz( 2004) and Waldfogel( 2010) find substantiation that pirating hurts deals, while Blackburn( 2004) and Oberholzer- Gee and Strumpf( 2007) find no substantial effect. In the case of musicale tickets, Mortimer etal.( 2012) showed that music pirating likely helped the trade of reciprocal goods.

3: For detailed report on “ The State of Data Collection on the Web, ” see the 2013 Krux Cross Industry Study at http//www.krux.com/pro/broadcasts/krux_research/CIS2013/.

4: The increased use and monetization of detailed client- position data through the trade of information and advertising has led to lesser demands for sequestration regulations since consumers frequently show great discomfort with sequestration violations( John etal. 2011). But sequestration also affects advertising effectiveness. Goldfarb and Tucker( 2011a, b) show that advertising is less effective when sequestration policy is strict.